IS THE ULFA (I) A FAILING MOVEMENT?

 

Pratas Saharia, Content Curator at "The Truth"

A land known for its composite population and innumerable tribes that call its soil home, Assam, has been reeling under the terror of militant outfits, both large and small forms for decades. Significant among these outfits are the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) mainly in the Brahmaputra valley; National Democratic Front of Borolandand (NDFB) and Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLR) in Bodo dominated areas; Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) in areas inhabited by immigrant Muslims; the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) in Bengali speaking areas; Birsa Commando Force (BCF); and All Santhal Cobra Force in the Santhal dominated areas - all these organization are looked as an internal security threat in the state.

ULFA did not start out as a large militant organization when it was first formed in 1979. It was a small group of young revolutionary civilians determined for the purpose of justice, and they first assembled in Rang Ghor, Sivsagar, with an aim to free the state from the ‘oppressive rule of Delhi.’ Not much later, this young group expanded to become one of the most terrifying militant forces that shaped the socio-economic and political future of the state in the decades to come, unleashing various forms of violence among the people, and gaining a cult-like following from within the state and beyond. In the final two decades of the millennium, it had the power to run parallel administrations along with having a very heavy-hand in the state government itself. In one of the books, authored by Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist, 1994, it writes, “ULFA has influenced the educational, social and economic aspirations of countless Assamese, determined their central political cognizance ... (it has) given rise to powerful assimilationist and nativist sentiments and backlash separatist agitation, to massive conflict over languages, education and employment policy.”

Scholars have pointed out that the issue of large existing immigrants in Assam and continuing influx of illegal migrants were identified as the main reason for taking up guns by members of ULFA. Other significant issues among them were unemployment, corruption in government machinery, dominance of non-Assamese in the business sector, alleged exploitation of Assam’s natural resources by foreign enterprises, and the large-scale alleged human rights violation by the central armed forces. Hence, ULFA’s popularity rested in the belief that a violent agitation from the Assamese was needed to expel the outsiders, security forces and stop the drain of Assam’s natural resources, all in one go. This argument helped them garner support from the civilians, and youth in large numbers joined the struggle to fight back. However, the intention to fight for these actual issues was lost somewhere in time and space. Instead of letting the movement come to a logical progress, the outfit seemed to have found the only way to use ‘violence’ to address it. No actual progress on ground or the push of policies to safeguard the native’s interest were seen. It only led the outfit scoring heights into large-scale criminalization in the state causing intense disruptions, resonating to endless human-rights violations where normalcy was defined by bomb-blasts, extortions and curfews.

However, by the end of the millennium, a number of factors led the ULFA to lose out on its share of popularity and support from the native civilians. It came to a sense of a failed mission. The primary reason being the decades of violence the cadres engaged in, only to be disillusioned with their demands and ideas of an ‘immigrant-free’ state. The official ULFA’s commanders and their chief claimed responsibility for attacks and unrest that only brought distaste to the organization’s functionality. The state-machinery also came heavy-handed on the outfit, inclined to kill a large number of cadres, capture their strongholds and make the remaining to flee to the forested pockets towards the bordering countries like Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Then followed the prolonged exile life, living under harsh situations, health crises and inappropriate diet at hideout camps, became unbearable for many cadres. In August 2000, 242 of its cadres, led by senior leader Lohit Deori laid down their arms in the presence of the Assam Chief Minister in Guwahati that made some difference and sighted hope for possible peace arrangement. The scores of others also surrendered in various operations subsequently. Soon later, about 532 militants were reported to have given up arms at the Rong Ghor, the organization’s birthplace. There were confessions from the higher commanders and some cadres that they certainly feel the mission to liberate Assam has taken an unknown future.

Another setback was when the Bhutan National Assembly passed a resolution during its 78th session in July, 2000, favoring military action against the ULFA and NDFB, to evict them from the Bhutanese soil. Simultaneously, the Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Rifles launched a joint operation against the militants holed up in the Chittagong Hills, capturing many militant cadres; and also scattering the others to run for cover in India, where they were further prosecuted. In years to come was also several reports of law enforcement authorities headlined on newspapers and media that spoke about their dreadful activities like murders and politics of power-play within the outfit cadres revealing their own internal conflicts. Regular news of ULFA cadres found dead for betrayal and shot by their camp commanders or killed for wanting to surrender from the organization are some of condescending affairs of discovery. The decades of terror have been unforgettable and unforgivable events by the Assamese people, where their own loved ones’ blood were split and their future compromised. That was when ULFA lost a major chunk of its civilian support. It was convinced that the outfit had transitioned into a full-fledged militant organization from a revolutionary one. Another factor for its decline was ULFA’s known links with the ‘agencies’ of foreign countries like Pakistan and China, which infinitely affected their credibility as an organization with actual progress in mind, portraying it rather as one endorsing public unrest and uncensored violence. And since, the crackdown by the Bhutanese Army, ULFA has not recovered its past strength though the organization is trying to make its presence felt through scattered kidnappings, bomb blasts and selective murder of migrant workers, businessmen and murdering their own cadres.

It was bound for the heavy-handed state mechanism to act aggressively against the banned outfit. The repeated volte-face of ULFA (I), the anti-talk faction formed after the recent split, during several abortive negotiations with the government, pushed peace talks to the back, allowing more national military actions against them. ULFA (I) is a lost cause and it’s time for closure. What started as an idealist movement to preserve the regionalism of the state has turned out to become an anti-citizen and anti-national disruptive force, causing fear in the people, taking innocent lives, while trying to justify the violence at the cost of Assam and Assam’s youth. Countless lives have been lost, youth have been misled to join the force and killed by their own cadres, when they wish to return to the mainstream after they had served the outfit for years.

The people of Assam are hoping for more developmental projects to sprung up in the state, the youth are moving from a life of illiteracy and poverty to better opportunities, the middle-class population are choosing to build blocks of progressions for the younger generation to benefit. The voice of new Assam is finding a way for peaceful settlement of demands, rather than supporting the militant organizations to speak for them. People have learnt, albeit gradually, that armed outfits only take innocent lives and halt development activities. ULFA (I) holds no significance anymore for the Assamese people, the reminiscence of isolated incidents of murder, kidnapping, extorsion and bomb-blasts are the only remaining traces of ULFA (I) today. It is time these events be stopped, condemned and bury the movement to its grave.

Disclaimer: Pratas Saharia, the contributor of this article is a Research Analyst and Content Curator at ‘The Truth’. Views expressed in this article is a work of personal opinion and research. It is not part of any organizational endorsement.